[{"id":"tlsbeginner-001","courseId":"tls-beginner","domain":"handshake","topic":"First message of a TLS 1.3 handshake","prompt":"A browser opens an HTTPS connection to a site that speaks TLS 1.3. Before any shared key exists, which handshake message does the browser send first?","hint":"Something has to offer its options before anything can be chosen from them.","explain":"A secure connection opens with a short exchange: one side announces the options it supports before any shared secret exists. Think about which side must speak before the other has anything to choose from.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"ClientHello","why":"The browser opens the handshake with ClientHello, which lists the parameters it supports."},{"id":"b","text":"ServerHello","whyNot":"That is the reply, and it is sent only after the opening message has arrived."},{"id":"c","text":"Certificate","whyNot":"The server's certificate comes later, after its ServerHello reply."},{"id":"d","text":"Finished","whyNot":"Finished is a MAC over the whole handshake, so it comes near the end, not the start."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"In TLS 1.3 the client sends ClientHello first, listing what it supports; the server answers with ServerHello.","concept":"In TLS 1.3 the client sends ClientHello first, listing what it supports; the server answers with ServerHello.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["A TLS 1.3 handshake always opens with the client's ClientHello."]},{"id":"tlsbeginner-002","courseId":"tls-beginner","domain":"handshake","topic":"Who picks the connection's parameters","prompt":"In TLS 1.3, a ClientHello carries a list of symmetric cipher and HKDF hash pairs. Which party determines the cryptographic parameters the connection will use?","hint":"One side makes an offer; think about which side must then decide on the connection's settings.","explain":"A handshake opens with a list of possible algorithm sets, yet the connection runs on just one. Something must turn the list into a single decision. Consider who can act on the list at that point.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446#section-2","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"The server, after processing the client's list","why":"The server processes the ClientHello and determines the appropriate cryptographic parameters for the connection."},{"id":"b","text":"The client, which sent the list in its ClientHello","whyNot":"The client supplies the list of pairs it supports; determining the parameters is a separate step the passage assigns to the other side."},{"id":"c","text":"Both sides, by agreeing on the first pair they both support","whyNot":"The passage describes one side determining the parameters after it reads the ClientHello, not a joint agreement on the first match."},{"id":"d","text":"The certificate authority that signed the server's certificate","whyNot":"Certificates are part of authenticating the server; the passage does not give a certificate authority any role in choosing the parameters."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"The server processes the ClientHello, which carries the client's list of cipher and HKDF hash pairs, and determines the connection's cryptographic parameters. The ServerHello then indicates the negotiated parameters.","concept":"The server processes the ClientHello, which carries the client's list of cipher and HKDF hash pairs, and determines the connection's cryptographic parameters. The ServerHello then indicates the negotiated parameters.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["In TLS 1.3 the server determines the connection's parameters from the ClientHello list."]},{"id":"tlsbeginner-003","courseId":"tls-beginner","domain":"handshake","topic":"What the handshake messages carry","prompt":"In a full TLS 1.3 handshake, which TWO of these statements about the handshake messages are correct?","hint":"Ask which message opens the exchange, and what kind of value each message carries.","explain":"Each handshake message carries a different kind of data, such as settings, identity material or proofs. Consider which kind each message holds before you judge a claim about it.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446","interaction":{"type":"multiple","tellCount":true},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"ClientHello lists the cipher suites the client supports","why":"The client's offer of cipher suites sits in ClientHello, and the server picks one of them."},{"id":"b","text":"Finished is a MAC computed over the entire handshake","why":"Finished is a MAC (message authentication code) over the entire handshake."},{"id":"c","text":"The client sends its Finished right after ClientHello","whyNot":"Finished comes after the certificate and signature messages, near the end of the exchange."},{"id":"d","text":"The client chooses the cipher suite and tells the server","whyNot":"The server selects the one suite from the list in ClientHello; the client does not make that choice."},{"id":"e","text":"ServerHello carries the server's signature over the handshake","whyNot":"The signature over the handshake is in CertificateVerify; ServerHello carries the chosen parameters."},{"id":"f","text":"The Certificate message contains the server's private key","whyNot":"Certificate holds the public key and identity; the private key is used to sign in CertificateVerify and is not part of Certificate."}],"answer":"ab","explanation":"ClientHello carries the client's offered cipher suites. Finished is a MAC over the entire handshake. Certificate carries the certificate; CertificateVerify carries the signature.","concept":"ClientHello carries the client's offered cipher suites. Finished is a MAC over the entire handshake. Certificate carries the certificate; CertificateVerify carries the signature.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["Finished is a MAC over the handshake, not a signature."]},{"id":"tlsbeginner-004","courseId":"tls-beginner","domain":"handshake","topic":"Proving possession of the certificate's key","prompt":"A TLS 1.3 server presents a certificate. Which handshake message proves the server holds the private key that matches that certificate?","hint":"Separate the message that says who the server is from the message that shows it can prove it.","explain":"A server's identity document and its proof of holding the matching secret travel as separate pieces. The proof covers everything exchanged so far, so an earlier change would break it.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"CertificateVerify","why":"CertificateVerify carries a signature over the entire handshake, made with the private key that matches the certificate."},{"id":"b","text":"Certificate","whyNot":"Certificate carries the certificate itself and its extensions, not the signature over the handshake."},{"id":"c","text":"ServerHello","whyNot":"ServerHello carries the server's chosen parameters; it does not prove key possession."},{"id":"d","text":"Finished","whyNot":"Finished is a MAC over the handshake, not a signature made with the private key."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"The Certificate message carries the server's certificate; CertificateVerify is a signature over the entire handshake, made with the matching private key.","concept":"The Certificate message carries the server's certificate; CertificateVerify is a signature over the entire handshake, made with the matching private key.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["A certificate alone does not prove the server holds its private key; CertificateVerify does."]},{"id":"tlsbeginner-005","courseId":"tls-beginner","domain":"handshake","topic":"HSTS is only honored over HTTPS","prompt":"A browser ignores a Strict-Transport-Security header that arrives over plain HTTP.","hint":"Think about who could tamper with a message sent over an unencrypted connection.","explain":"Some response headers change how a browser treats a site later, so the browser must be able to trust them. Consider who could alter such a header on each kind of connection.","source":"https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security","interaction":{"type":"true-false"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"True","why":"Browsers ignore the header over HTTP, so a man in the middle cannot alter it or add it for a host without HTTPS."},{"id":"b","text":"False","whyNot":"Browsers do ignore the header over HTTP; it only takes effect when it arrives over HTTPS."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"Browsers accept Strict-Transport-Security only from HTTPS responses; over plain HTTP they ignore it, so an attacker cannot change the policy.","concept":"Browsers accept Strict-Transport-Security only from HTTPS responses; over plain HTTP they ignore it, so an attacker cannot change the policy.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["HSTS only counts when it arrives over HTTPS."]}]