[{"id":"tlsadvanced-001","courseId":"tls-advanced","domain":"handshake","topic":"legacy_version fixed at 0x0303","prompt":"A TLS 1.3 client builds its ClientHello. A middlebox on the path reads the legacy_version field, and some old servers reject unfamiliar values there. Which value must the client put in legacy_version?","hint":"Think about what this field meant in older versions, and where TLS 1.3 moved the version offer.","explain":"Early versions used this field to negotiate the version, and some servers mishandled numbers they did not know. The real version offer moved elsewhere; this field kept a fixed compatibility value.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-4.1.2","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"0x0303, the TLS 1.2 version number","why":"legacy_version must be 0x0303 in every TLS 1.3 ClientHello; the real version preferences go in supported_versions."},{"id":"b","text":"0x0304, the TLS 1.3 version number","whyNot":"0x0304 is the value named inside supported_versions, not the value of legacy_version."},{"id":"c","text":"The highest version the client supports","whyNot":"That was the field's meaning before TLS 1.3; the design replaced it with a fixed value."},{"id":"d","text":"Zero, so middleboxes ignore the field","whyNot":"Zero is not allowed; the field must hold the fixed 0x0303 value."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"In TLS 1.3 legacy_version is always 0x0303, and the client states its version preferences in the supported_versions extension.","concept":"In TLS 1.3 legacy_version is always 0x0303, and the client states its version preferences in the supported_versions extension.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["A TLS 1.3 ClientHello shows 0x0303 in legacy_version plus a supported_versions entry of 0x0304."]},{"id":"tlsadvanced-002","courseId":"tls-advanced","domain":"handshake","topic":"Renegotiation forbidden in TLS 1.3","prompt":"In TLS 1.3, a server that has completed a handshake and then receives a new ClientHello on the same connection must end the connection with an unexpected_message alert.","hint":"Consider what a second handshake inside a live connection would mean for the protocol.","explain":"Renegotiation is a second handshake run over a connection that is already protected. Versions differ on whether that is allowed, and an out-of-place message counts as an error.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-4.1.2","interaction":{"type":"true-false"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"True","why":"TLS 1.3 forbids renegotiation, so a ClientHello that arrives later is an error and the server terminates with unexpected_message."},{"id":"b","text":"False","whyNot":"Renegotiation is not allowed in TLS 1.3, so the server does not start a new handshake on that connection."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"TLS 1.3 forbids renegotiation: a server that negotiated 1.3 and receives a ClientHello at any other time terminates the connection with unexpected_message.","concept":"TLS 1.3 forbids renegotiation: a server that negotiated 1.3 and receives a ClientHello at any other time terminates the connection with unexpected_message.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["A ClientHello arriving after the handshake on TLS 1.3 is an error, not a new handshake."]},{"id":"tlsadvanced-003","courseId":"tls-advanced","domain":"handshake","topic":"TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV","prompt":"A client retries a failed connection at a lower protocol version and adds TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV to its cipher suites. Which TWO statements about this signal are correct?","hint":"Ask what a server can learn from a retry, and whether this value is a real algorithm.","explain":"Attackers and faults can push a connection to an older version. A value in the offer lets the server spot a retry it should not need, and the protocol defines how it reacts.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7507.html#section-3","interaction":{"type":"multiple","tellCount":true},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"A server that sees it, supports a higher version than the client sent, and supports the client's version must send a fatal inappropriate_fallback alert.","why":"That is the required response when the client's version is below the server's highest supported version."},{"id":"b","text":"A server can never select it as the cipher suite, even if the client lists it.","why":"It is a signalling value that corresponds to no cryptosystem, so the server never selects it."},{"id":"c","text":"It is a real cipher suite that protects the retried connection.","whyNot":"It corresponds to no set of cryptosystems; it is only a signal the server can read."},{"id":"d","text":"A client resuming a session at the same version must still include it.","whyNot":"A client resuming at the version negotiated for that session must not include it."},{"id":"e","text":"It can replace proper version negotiation, so implementations may skip it.","whyNot":"The signal is explicitly not a suitable substitute for proper version negotiation."},{"id":"f","text":"A server answers it with the alert whenever the value appears, even when versions match.","whyNot":"When the client's version is already the highest the server supports, the server proceeds as usual."}],"answer":"ab","explanation":"TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV is a signal, not a cipher suite: servers never select it, and they answer a downgraded retry with a fatal inappropriate_fallback alert when they could have negotiated a higher version.","concept":"TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV is a signal, not a cipher suite: servers never select it, and they answer a downgraded retry with a fatal inappropriate_fallback alert when they could have negotiated a higher version.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV flags a retry at a lower version; it does not replace real version negotiation."]},{"id":"tlsadvanced-004","courseId":"tls-advanced","domain":"handshake","topic":"Cookie extension in a retried ClientHello","prompt":"A server answers a ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest that carries a cookie extension, though the client's first ClientHello offered no cookie. What does the client do next?","hint":"Consider which extensions a peer may send without being asked, and in which message.","explain":"Endpoints normally answer only the extensions the peer requested, and an unrequested extension is a fatal error. A retry request is the one place where an extension may arrive unasked.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-4.2.2","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"Copy the cookie into the updated ClientHello and send it","why":"A cookie in a HelloRetryRequest is the allowed exception, and the client includes it in its second ClientHello."},{"id":"b","text":"Abort the handshake with an unsupported_extension alert","whyNot":"That alert covers unrequested extensions in general, but the cookie in a retry request is the stated exception."},{"id":"c","text":"Resend the first ClientHello unchanged, since nothing else was asked for","whyNot":"The client may change only what the retry request asks for, and a supplied cookie is one of those changes."},{"id":"d","text":"Abort with illegal_parameter, since retry requests carry only supported_versions and key_share","whyNot":"The defined retry request extensions are supported_versions, cookie and key_share, so this reason is wrong."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"A cookie is the one extension a server may send in a HelloRetryRequest without the client offering it, and the client returns it in the retried ClientHello.","concept":"A cookie is the one extension a server may send in a HelloRetryRequest without the client offering it, and the client returns it in the retried ClientHello.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["Unrequested extensions normally end a handshake; the cookie in a retry request is the stated exception."]},{"id":"tlsadvanced-005","courseId":"tls-advanced","domain":"handshake","topic":"supported_versions is mandatory to implement","prompt":"A team builds a TLS 1.3 stack and has no application profile that changes the defaults. Which of these extensions must a TLS-compliant application implement?","hint":"Look for the list the specification calls mandatory-to-implement.","explain":"Extensions are optional unless a specification names them. A named set applies unless an application profile says otherwise.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-9.2","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"supported_versions","why":"It is on the mandatory-to-implement list, so a compliant application must implement it when no profile overrides that."},{"id":"b","text":"padding","whyNot":"Padding is defined in RFC 7685 and is not on the mandatory list."},{"id":"c","text":"application_layer_protocol_negotiation","whyNot":"ALPN selects an application protocol but is not on the mandatory list."},{"id":"d","text":"max_fragment_length","whyNot":"It is an RFC 6066 extension and is not on the mandatory list."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"A TLS 1.3 specification names the extensions every compliant application must implement absent a profile, and supported_versions is among them.","concept":"A TLS 1.3 specification names the extensions every compliant application must implement absent a profile, and supported_versions is among them.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["Mandatory-to-implement lists apply only when no application profile specifies otherwise."]}]