[{"id":"oauthoidcadvanced-001","courseId":"oauth-oidc-advanced","domain":"authorization-flows","topic":"Pushed authorization requests","prompt":"Your client uses pushed authorization requests (RFC 9126). It POSTs its full authorization parameters over HTTPS to the PAR endpoint. What does a successful response contain?","hint":"Think about what must reach the browser redirect, and what the client needs back from the POST.","explain":"Parameters sent through a browser redirect appear in the address bar and face size limits. Storing them server-side first, over a direct request, lets the redirect carry less.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9126","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"An authorization code the client can exchange right away","whyNot":"A pushed request returns no code; the code comes later from the authorization endpoint after the user signs in."},{"id":"b","text":"A request_uri and an expires_in lifetime","why":"The server answers 201 with a request URI and its lifetime in seconds; the client then sends the URI to the authorization endpoint."},{"id":"c","text":"A signed JWT recording the user's consent","whyNot":"The push response carries no consent; the user authorizes later, at the authorization endpoint."},{"id":"d","text":"An access token scoped to the requested resources","whyNot":"No access token is issued at this step; tokens come from the token endpoint after the flow completes."}],"answer":"b","explanation":"RFC 9126: the client POSTs the authorization parameters to the PAR endpoint over HTTPS; on success the server returns HTTP 201 with request_uri and expires_in, and the client then sends the request_uri to the authorization endpoint.","concept":"RFC 9126: the client POSTs the authorization parameters to the PAR endpoint over HTTPS; on success the server returns HTTP 201 with request_uri and expires_in, and the client then sends the request_uri to the authorization endpoint.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["Pushed requests keep authorization parameters out of the browser redirect; the redirect carries only a short reference."]},{"id":"oauthoidcadvanced-002","courseId":"oauth-oidc-advanced","domain":"authorization-flows","topic":"Password grant in current OAuth guidance","prompt":"Under RFC 9700, a vendor's own first-party mobile app may use the Resource Owner Password Credentials grant to collect the user's password and exchange it for tokens.","hint":"Ask whether the app is ever meant to handle the user's password itself.","explain":"A grant that has the app collect the user's password hands that secret to the app. A redirect-based grant sends the user to the provider, so the app gets only a code to trade for tokens.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700","interaction":{"type":"true-false"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"True","whyNot":"RFC 9700 says the Resource Owner Password Credentials grant MUST NOT be used."},{"id":"b","text":"False","why":"The BCP forbids the password grant; an app should not collect the user's password to exchange it for tokens."}],"answer":"b","explanation":"RFC 9700 section 2.4 says the Resource Owner Password Credentials grant MUST NOT be used, so an app should not collect the user's password to exchange for tokens.","concept":"RFC 9700 section 2.4 says the Resource Owner Password Credentials grant MUST NOT be used, so an app should not collect the user's password to exchange for tokens.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["Collecting the user's password in the app to fetch tokens is no longer an accepted OAuth pattern."]},{"id":"oauthoidcadvanced-003","courseId":"oauth-oidc-advanced","domain":"authorization-flows","topic":"PKCE code verifier length","prompt":"A native client generates a PKCE code_verifier for an authorization code request. Which length range does RFC 7636 allow for the verifier?","hint":"The verifier is a random string, and the spec bounds how long it may be.","explain":"A PKCE verifier is a random secret that only the original client knows. The spec bounds its size so both sides handle it predictably, and the server later recomputes a value from it to compare.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7636","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"8 to 32 characters","whyNot":"Too short: the spec sets a minimum of 43 characters for the verifier."},{"id":"b","text":"Exactly 64 characters","whyNot":"The spec allows a range rather than one fixed size; 64 is just a common choice."},{"id":"c","text":"43 to 128 characters","why":"RFC 7636 sets a minimum of 43 and a maximum of 128 characters for the code_verifier."},{"id":"d","text":"Up to 256 characters","whyNot":"The maximum is 128, so 256 is outside the range the spec allows."}],"answer":"c","explanation":"RFC 7636 section 4.1: the code_verifier has a minimum length of 43 characters and a maximum length of 128 characters.","concept":"RFC 7636 section 4.1: the code_verifier has a minimum length of 43 characters and a maximum length of 128 characters.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["A PKCE verifier must be random and long enough to be unguessable, and no longer than the spec allows."]},{"id":"oauthoidcadvanced-004","courseId":"oauth-oidc-advanced","domain":"authorization-flows","topic":"ID Token validation","prompt":"Your client has just received an ID Token in a token response. Which TWO checks does OpenID Connect Core require before the client trusts the token's claims?","hint":"Two claims say who the token is meant for and how long it stays valid.","explain":"An identity provider signs a statement about one sign-in. A valid signature shows who issued it, not that it was meant for this app or is still in date.","source":"https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html","interaction":{"type":"multiple","tellCount":true},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"The aud claim contains the client's own client_id","why":"Section 3.1.3.7 says the client MUST validate that aud contains its client_id value registered at the issuer."},{"id":"b","text":"The current time is before the exp claim","why":"The spec says the current time MUST be before the time represented by exp."},{"id":"c","text":"A valid signature is enough; aud and exp need no checks","whyNot":"A valid signature shows who issued the token; the aud and exp checks are separate requirements."},{"id":"d","text":"The azp claim must always be present","whyNot":"The spec asks the client to check azp only when it is present; it does not require the claim."},{"id":"e","text":"The exp check can be skipped when the token came over HTTPS","whyNot":"The exp check applies to every ID Token; a secure connection does not remove it."},{"id":"f","text":"The iss check is skipped for tokens from the token endpoint","whyNot":"The issuer must match the iss claim for ID Tokens generally, including one received from the token endpoint."}],"answer":"ab","explanation":"OpenID Connect Core section 3.1.3.7: the client MUST validate that aud contains its client_id and that the current time is before exp; azp is checked only when present.","concept":"OpenID Connect Core section 3.1.3.7: the client MUST validate that aud contains its client_id and that the current time is before exp; azp is checked only when present.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["A valid ID Token signature is not enough; check the audience and the expiry too."]},{"id":"oauthoidcadvanced-005","courseId":"oauth-oidc-advanced","domain":"authorization-flows","topic":"Native apps and the user agent","prompt":"A mobile app needs to sign users in through an OAuth provider. The developer wants the login page shown inside the app's own web view so the app can see the form fields. What does RFC 8252 require?","hint":"Think about who can read what the user types on the login form.","explain":"A native app can show a page in a separate program the platform provides, or in a view built into the app. What the app can see differs between the two, so the guidance weighs it.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8252","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"An embedded web view, since the app needs to control the page","whyNot":"RFC 8252 says native apps MUST NOT use embedded user-agents to perform authorization requests."},{"id":"b","text":"A hidden frame inside the app, to keep the flow silent","whyNot":"A frame embedded in the app is an embedded user-agent, which the spec forbids for these requests."},{"id":"c","text":"An external user agent, such as the system browser","why":"RFC 8252 says native apps MUST use an external user-agent to perform OAuth authorization requests."},{"id":"d","text":"Any user agent, as long as the redirect URI uses HTTPS","whyNot":"The redirect URI's scheme doesn't choose the user agent; embedded ones are ruled out for authorization requests."}],"answer":"c","explanation":"RFC 8252 section 5 says native apps MUST use an external user-agent to perform OAuth authorization requests, and section 8.12 says they MUST NOT use embedded user-agents to perform them.","concept":"RFC 8252 section 5 says native apps MUST use an external user-agent to perform OAuth authorization requests, and section 8.12 says they MUST NOT use embedded user-agents to perform them.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["Native apps should send users to an external user agent for OAuth sign-in, never a web view inside the app."]}]