[{"id":"awssaac03-101","courseId":"aws-saa-c03","domain":"secure-architectures","topic":"SCP guardrails","prompt":"A company has 40 member accounts in an AWS Organizations organization with all features enabled. The security team must guarantee that no principal in any member account, including account administrators, can stop or delete AWS CloudTrail trails. The company wants the solution with the LEAST operational overhead. Which solution meets these requirements?","hint":"Think about a control that sits above the account administrators and applies to every account at once.","explain":"Account administrators can edit IAM policies in their own account, so a control kept there can be removed by the people it constrains. Consider which layer above accounts could hold a limit for all of them.","source":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"Attach a service control policy that denies the CloudTrail StopLogging and DeleteTrail actions to the organization root or the relevant OUs.","why":"An SCP sets the maximum permissions for IAM users and roles in member accounts, including administrators, and one attachment covers all accounts, including accounts created later."},{"id":"b","text":"Deploy an IAM policy that denies those actions to every IAM role in each account by using a CloudFormation StackSet.","whyNot":"Account administrators can detach or edit IAM policies in their own account, so this is not a guarantee, and every new role needs the policy as well."},{"id":"c","text":"Create an AWS Config rule in each account that detects a stopped trail and invokes a Lambda function to restart it.","whyNot":"This is detective and reactive: logging is interrupted before it is restored, and rules and functions must be deployed and maintained in every account."},{"id":"d","text":"Set a permissions boundary on every IAM role in the member accounts that excludes the CloudTrail actions.","whyNot":"Boundaries are attached per user or role, so roles created without one are unrestricted and the setup is high-effort."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"Service control policies define the maximum available permissions for IAM users and roles in member accounts, so they can enforce organization-wide guardrails that account administrators cannot override.","concept":"Service control policies define the maximum available permissions for IAM users and roles in member accounts, so they can enforce organization-wide guardrails that account administrators cannot override.","rev":1,"kind":"scenario","takeaways":["An SCP is the only control admins in member accounts cannot override; one attachment at the root covers every account."]},{"id":"awssaac03-102","courseId":"aws-saa-c03","domain":"secure-architectures","topic":"SCP scope","prompt":"A security engineer attaches an SCP that denies s3:DeleteBucket to the root of an organization. A day later, an administrator signed in to the management account deletes an S3 bucket in that account successfully, while administrators in member accounts are blocked. What explains this behavior?","hint":"Consider which account type SCPs are designed to leave alone.","explain":"An organization has one account that creates it and holds billing, and it is treated differently from member accounts. Consider which principals escape restrictions others face.","source":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"SCPs apply only to IAM users and not to IAM roles, and the administrator used a role.","whyNot":"SCPs affect both IAM users and IAM roles (and the member account root user) in member accounts."},{"id":"b","text":"The administrator's AdministratorAccess IAM policy overrides the SCP deny in that account.","whyNot":"An explicit deny in an SCP cannot be overridden by an identity-based allow in an account the SCP applies to."},{"id":"c","text":"SCPs do not restrict users and roles in the management account; they affect only member accounts.","why":"AWS documents that SCPs have no effect on users or roles in the management account, which is why that account should hold few workloads."},{"id":"d","text":"SCPs take up to 24 hours to propagate, so the management account has not received the policy yet.","whyNot":"SCP changes are not delayed in a way that exempts a particular account; the management account is exempt by design."}],"answer":"c","explanation":"SCPs never grant permissions and never apply to the management account; they limit IAM users and roles in member accounts.","concept":"SCPs never grant permissions and never apply to the management account; they limit IAM users and roles in member accounts.","rev":1,"kind":"scenario","takeaways":["SCPs only restrict member-account principals; they never grant permissions and never affect the management account."]},{"id":"awssaac03-103","courseId":"aws-saa-c03","domain":"secure-architectures","topic":"Cross-account access","prompt":"Developers in a development account occasionally need to read objects in an S3 bucket that lives in a separate production account. Security requires temporary credentials, multi-factor authentication for each access, and no new long-lived credentials. Which solution meets these requirements?","hint":"Delegation through a role keeps credentials short-lived and lets you add a sign-in condition.","explain":"Shared long-lived keys are hard to attribute to a person and hard to revoke. Consider what a trust relationship is able to name, and which condition key checks how the caller authenticated.","source":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_common-scenarios_aws-accounts.html","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"Create IAM users in the production account for each developer and distribute their access keys.","whyNot":"Access keys are long-lived credentials and require managing a second set of identities."},{"id":"b","text":"Add a bucket ACL that grants read access to the AuthenticatedUsers group.","whyNot":"That group includes any authenticated AWS user in the world, which is far broader than intended, and it provides no MFA enforcement."},{"id":"c","text":"Create an IAM role in the production account that trusts the development account and requires MFA, then let developers assume it through AWS STS.","why":"The trust policy names the development account, STS returns temporary credentials, and the role can be configured so only MFA-authenticated principals can assume it."},{"id":"d","text":"Store one shared set of production access keys in Secrets Manager in the development account and rotate them monthly.","whyNot":"A shared long-lived key breaks individual accountability and still lacks per-use MFA."}],"answer":"c","explanation":"A role with a trust policy for another account lets that account's users switch roles and receive temporary credentials, optionally requiring MFA.","concept":"A role with a trust policy for another account lets that account's users switch roles and receive temporary credentials, optionally requiring MFA.","rev":1,"kind":"scenario","takeaways":["Cross-account access: a role in the target account trusts the source account; users assume it for temporary credentials."]},{"id":"awssaac03-104","courseId":"aws-saa-c03","domain":"secure-architectures","topic":"Permissions boundaries","prompt":"A company wants application teams to create their own IAM roles for Lambda functions without waiting for the central security team. The teams must not be able to create roles that exceed a maximum set of permissions defined by security. Which TWO actions should a solutions architect take? (Choose TWO.)","hint":"Delegation is safe when the maximum is defined once and creation is only allowed together with it.","explain":"Delegated teams can create their own roles, but a guaranteed ceiling on their power may be required. Consider which request parameters IAM can check at creation time.","source":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html","interaction":{"type":"multiple","tellCount":true},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"Grant the teams iam:CreateRole and iam:AttachRolePolicy with a condition that requires the iam:PermissionsBoundary value to equal the boundary policy ARN.","why":"This makes creation succeed only when the approved boundary is attached, so teams cannot create unbounded roles."},{"id":"b","text":"Grant the teams the iam:* actions on all resources and review CloudTrail weekly for excessive permissions.","whyNot":"Review after the fact is detective, and unrestricted IAM access allows privilege escalation."},{"id":"c","text":"Create a managed policy that defines the maximum allowed permissions and use it as the permissions boundary for roles the teams create.","why":"A permissions boundary sets the maximum permissions an identity-based policy can grant to a role."},{"id":"d","text":"Attach an SCP that allows only the Lambda service to the whole organization.","whyNot":"An SCP limits what accounts can do in aggregate; it does not define a per-role maximum, and it would break other workloads."},{"id":"e","text":"Enable an IAM Access Analyzer unused access analyzer in each account.","whyNot":"It reports unused access after the fact; it does not cap permissions at creation time."}],"answer":"ac","explanation":"A permissions boundary caps what an IAM entity can be granted, and a condition on iam:PermissionsBoundary lets administrators delegate role creation safely.","concept":"A permissions boundary caps what an IAM entity can be granted, and a condition on iam:PermissionsBoundary lets administrators delegate role creation safely.","rev":1,"kind":"scenario","takeaways":["Delegating role creation safely: require the boundary on every role the team makes."]},{"id":"awssaac03-105","courseId":"aws-saa-c03","domain":"secure-architectures","topic":"IAM Identity Center","prompt":"A company with 25 AWS accounts in AWS Organizations uses an external SAML 2.0 identity provider for its workforce. Administrators want employees to sign in once with corporate credentials and receive role-based access to the accounts they need, with the LEAST administrative effort. Which solution meets these requirements?","hint":"One federation point can serve every account in the organization.","explain":"Each account can trust an outside directory alone, or one central layer can broker access for all. Compare the upkeep of repeating each trust against a single configuration.","source":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/what-is.html","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"Create an Amazon Cognito user pool for employees and exchange tokens for console access.","whyNot":"Cognito is designed for application end users; it is not the workforce SSO service for AWS accounts."},{"id":"b","text":"Create an IAM user for each employee in every account and synchronize passwords with a script.","whyNot":"This multiplies identities and credentials across 25 accounts and is error-prone."},{"id":"c","text":"Create a separate SAML identity provider and IAM roles manually in each of the 25 accounts.","whyNot":"It works but repeats configuration per account and requires maintaining each trust relationship, which is more effort than a single Identity Center configuration."},{"id":"d","text":"Enable IAM Identity Center with the external IdP as the identity source and assign permission sets to groups for each account.","why":"Identity Center provides a single federation point, an access portal, and permission sets provisioned across accounts."}],"answer":"d","explanation":"IAM Identity Center connects a workforce identity provider once and manages access to many AWS accounts through permission sets.","concept":"IAM Identity Center connects a workforce identity provider once and manages access to many AWS accounts through permission sets.","rev":1,"kind":"scenario","takeaways":["IAM Identity Center plus permission sets is the workforce SSO answer for many accounts and an external IdP."]}]